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1 Introduction
When bilateral bargaining is one of the components of an economic model,
most authors use the Nash Bargaining Solution (NBS) as a reduced form
that maps the fundamentals of the model into negotiated outcomes. Since
we often know very little about how agents actually bargain in the real world,
a black-box approach seems justied. After all, the principles and intuitions
implicit in the NBS are very convincing. However, such broad consensus does
not exist when bargaining involves three players and di¤erent pairs of players
can achieve by themselves di¤erent agreements.1 This is the case when one
(or more) player(s) may trade or reach an agreement with two alternative,
potential partners. When analyzing such problems, some authors take a
non-cooperative approach and assume a particular bargaining protocol. An
alternative is to invoke solution concepts borrowed from cooperative game
theory. The Shapley value is the most popular choice, as a simple value
characterized by seemingly natural axioms. Yet, the Shapley value predicts
outcomes that in some cases are controversial, to say the least.2
This paper presents a new solution concept for three-player cooperative
games that can be readily applied to predicting the outcome of three-party
negotiations. Instead of attempting to identify sensible axioms that single
out one outcome or considering a particular protocol that would do the
job, our approach is based on a few mainstream ideas in economics. The
rst is that the NBS is a satisfactory prediction for two-player bargaining
or in general for what are called pure bargaining games, where the only
coalition that adds some surplus is the grand coalition.3 The second is that
when players bargain they also form beliefs about what would happen if
agreement is not reached in that particular negotiation. The third one is
1Examples of economic models that include three-player bargaining abound. In Section
4 we discuss in detail some particular examples.
2See, for instance, De Meza and Selvaggi (2007), page 89.
3See Krishna and Serrano (1996) for a non-cooperative motivation for this solution.
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that these beliefs should satisfy some notion of consistency with payo¤s. 4
Consider one of the simplest of these three-person bargaining situations,
that of a buyer that has to choose among two potential sellers. A prediction
for any such model should include a (possibly probabilistic) prediction of
which of the two trades will take place and how players would split the
surplus in each of the two potential trades.5 Also, if the latter prediction is
to be made according to the NBS, then disagreement points for each of the
two negotiations should be specied. For the buyer, the disagreement payo¤s
should be endogenous. Indeed, the fallback option in each negotiation is the
possibility to trade with the alternative seller.
As we allow for more complex interactions, we will need to consider the
case where all two-player negotiations result in some positive surplus. This is
known as the three-player/three-cake problem (see Binmore, 1985). In this
case, disagreement points and payo¤s will need to be simultaneously and
endogenously determined for all three players in all three alternative two-
player negotiations. Moreover, now the (possibly probabilistic) prediction
of what negotiation will end in an agreement will be necessary in order to
consistently calculate (expected) fallback options.
Finally, what is predicted for the three-player/three-cake problem may
leave gains that the three players may realize by coordinating. In other
words, the total surplus that the grand coalition can realize may exceed
the surplus expected from bilateral negotiations. That may be so because of
synergies that can be realized only with the participation of all three players
or just because, absent coordination, players anticipate that ine¢ cient bi-
4 In our previous research on labor contracting (Burguet et al., 2002) we also had to
decide how to predict the outcome of negotiations among three players. In fact, in the
Appendix of that paper we timidly started to outline some of the ideas that we fully
develop here.
5The Shapley value predicts that the buyer will buy from the most e¢ cient seller, yet
the non trading seller will still receive a positive payment at the expense of the trading
partners. Such a positive payo¤ is sometimes interpreted as the bribe that the non-trading
seller receives in order to allow the implementation of the e¢ cient trade. We will show that
such a justication makes sense only in some games but not in this particular example.
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lateral agreements may occur with positive probability. In this case, players
may be able to avoid ine¢ cient outcomes through three-party negotiations
and then we expect them to share the extra surplus according to the (gen-
eralized) NBS.6 In particular, the disagreement point for this three-player
negotiation should be the playersexpected payo¤s in the alternative to the
grand coalition agreement: the predicted outcome for bilateral negotiations.
As we have mentioned, our solution concept requires that agents form
(and share) beliefs on the probabilities of success of each alternative nego-
tiation. This is an important feature of our concept. In addition, we will
impose a consistency requirement on this system of beliefs: parties should
not expect a two-player negotiation to succeed when both parties to that
negotiation prefer their alternative one. In Section 2 we present our solution
concept, the R solution, as a formalization of these ideas. We show that
the R solution exists and is unique. That is, it turns out that these simple
ideas are su¢ cient to predict the division of surplus in these games. More-
over, computing the R solution is a straightforward exercise. We provide
these computations for all parameter values.
The idea that disagreement points in three-party negotiations should
emanate from the alternative to these negotiations, that is, the predicted
outcomes of simultaneous, bilateral negotiations, is probably non contro-
versial. The same applies to assuming that disagreement points in simul-
taneous, bilateral negotiations should be endogenous. Moreover, the ideas
are not novel. Bennetts (1997) approach to the analysis of such negotia-
tions is the closest to ours in spirit (also, see Binmore, 1985, and references
in Bennett, 1997). Indeed, Bennett also argues that disagreement payo¤s
should be obtained endogenously, but in her solution players do not form
and share beliefs about the probability of success of each bilateral negotia-
6Three-party negotiations may not be feasible due to outside constraints. In Section
4, we consider one case when this is so.
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tion.7 Indeed, in Bennetts approach, when two parties negotiate both use
as a fallback option their own agreement with the third player. That is
equivalent to assuming that di¤erent players assign probability one to two
di¤erent, mutually exclusive outcomes. On the contrary, a central piece of
our concept is the endogenously determined, coherent system of beliefs that
players use to compute their endogenous fallback options.8
We analyze the properties of the R solution in Section 3. We show
that the R solution satises symmetry, e¢ ciency, and the dummy player
axioms. Thus, it has to violate the additivity axiom since the Shapley value
is the only solution concept that satises all four. Indeed, the R solution
is not additive. We argue that, rather than a weakness, this non additivity
is a desirable property of the concept for problems like the one discussed
above. The seemingly innocuous additivity axiom implicitly imposes too
much structure on what "protocols" are feasible for the players. For instance,
in our one-buyer, two-sellers example, it implicitly imposes that the buyer
cannot attempt bundling or make joint o¤ers for two goods when dealing
with the same two potential sellers of these two goods. The R solution lets
the primitives of the problem speak about such possibilities.
Contrary to the Shapley value, the R solution is a selection of the core
when the latter is not empty. When the core is empty, the Aumann-Maschler
bargaining set (BS) is the most popular generalization. The BS contains
the core and is never empty. We show that, again contrary to the Shapley
value, the R solution is a selection of the BS. In fact, for superadditive,
7 In Bennett (1997), a solution should specify the division of surplus in each alternative
bilateral negotiation. The disagreement point in each negotiation is the payo¤ that each
player would obtain in her alternative negotiation. Thus, the disagreement point in some
negotiations may be outside the feasible set of that negotiation, which Bennett interprets
as failure of the negotiation. A predicted outcome species what negotiation will succeed
and then sharing of the surplus according to the NBS (or any other concept) given the
corresponding disagreement point.
8 In Section 3 we also discuss alternative approaches to endogenizing fallback options,
which are implicit in the notion of consistency proposed by Hart and Mas-Colell (1989)
and Serrano and Shimomura (1998).
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three-player TU-games, the BS (for the grand coalition) coincides with the
core when the latter is not empty, and is a singleton when the core is empty.
Thus, the R solution coincides with the BS in the latter case. Moreover, if
bilateral bargaining is all there is in the game, that is, if the grand coalition
does not add any additional surplus, the R solution is the most egalitar-
ian selection in the BS. Thus, it is more egalitarian than other, di¤erent
selections of the core or the BS, like the nucleolus.9
We postulate the R solution as a satisfactory, unifying concept that can
be used to analyze models that include three-party negotiations. In Section 4
we illustrate the use of our concept in some leading models in the Industrial
Organization literature. Exclusive contracts (Segal and Whinston, 2000),
endogenous mergers (Horn and Persson, 2001), and the property-rights the-
ory of the rm (Hart and Moore, 1990) have been analyzed in models with
a renegotiation stage, but using some other, diverse solution concepts. In
Section 4 we also discuss the use and implications of the R solution in these
cases. Section 5 o¤ers some closing discussions. Finally, most of the proofs
are relegated to an Appendix.
2 The R solution of a three-person game
Let N = f1; 2; 3g be the set of players, and let 2N represent the set of
subsets of N . An element Z 2 2N represents a coalition. A TU game in
characteristic form is the pair (N; v), where v : 2N ! R satises v(?) = 0.
We assume v to be superadditive.
Assumption 1 (superadditivity): If Z;Z 0  2N and Z \ Z 0 = ?, then
v(Z) + v(Z 0)  v(Z [ Z 0).
To save some space, we will use an abbreviated notation for the v func-
tion. Thus, we will let vij = v(fi; jg), vi = v(fig) and V = v(f1; 2; 3g).
9The nucleolus is also a selection of the BS. Thus, when the core is empty, the nucleolus
and the R Solution coincide. However, when the core is not empty and set-valued, the
two concepts di¤er. More on this in Section 3.
6
Also, every time we write "for all i; j" or "for all i; j; k" we mean for all
i; j = 1; 2; 3; i 6= j, and for all i; j; k = 1; 2; 3, i 6= j 6= k; i 6= k, respec-
tively. That is, di¤erent sub/superindices in the same expression will al-
ways denote di¤erent players. Without loss of generality, we will assume
that v12   v1   v2  v13   v1   v3  v23   v2   v3. In other words, coalition
f1; 2g is the (weakly) most "e¢ cient" among the two-player coalitions and
coalition f2; 3g is the (weakly) least e¢ cient.
The heart of our solution concept is a prediction of the outcomes of
the three possible bilateral negotiations, including a prediction of which
of these negotiations would succeed (with what probability), should three-
player negotiations fail.10 In many cases this is in fact all that will be needed
for predicting the outcome of the whole game.
We begin by dening this prediction for the outcome of simultaneous,
bilateral negotiations. For each player i in each bilateral negotiation ij, we
denote is predicted payo¤ by uiji . Also, we represent by pij the predicted
probability that players i and j are the ones whose negotiation succeeds and
then "trade". Finally, since our concept is based on the two-player NBS, for
each player i in each bilateral negotiation ij, we will dene is disagreement
payo¤ or fallback option, which we will represent by tiji . Before dening our
solution, we explain the consistency requirements on these values that will
dene our solution concept for simultaneous, bilateral negotiations.
i) Given the fallback options, tiji , players i and j share any extra surplus
equally, provided this surplus is positive. That is, uiji = t
ij
i +
1
2

vij   tiji   tijj

=
1
2

vij + t
ij
i   tijj

, if vij  tiji + tijj . However, if their disagreement payo¤s
sum up to an amount in excess of the worth of the coalition, vij < t
ij
i + t
ij
j ,
then players will not be willing to reach an agreement. In this case, uiji = t
ik
i .
In the next paragraph we discuss the reasons and interpretation of this spec-
10As in the one-buyer/two-sellers example or in the three-player/three-cake game, we
assume that only one of the two-player coalitions could form, if the grand coalition cannot
form. See Sections 4 and 5 for more on this.
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ication.
ii) The disagreement payo¤s are computed according to the payo¤s pre-
dicted in, and the probability distribution over alternative, two-party negoti-
ations. In particular, assume that the negotiation between i and j ounders,
and players contemplate their options in the larger picture of all two-player
negotiations. As players calculate what they expect to get in this scenario,
tiji , they predict that, (a) with probability pij what they face is precisely
this default, tiji ; (b) with probability pik coalition (i; k) will reach an agree-
ment, and player is payo¤ will be uiji ; and (c) with probability pjk it will
be coalition (j; k) who will agree, and hence is payo¤ will be vi. Thus,
tiji = pijt
ij
i + piku
ik
i + pjkvi. If pij < 1 we can rewrite this expression as:
tiji =
piku
ik
i + pjkvi
1  pij :
Thus, player i0s fallback option in her negotiation with j is the expected
payo¤ in alternative negotiations, where the expectation is "conditional" on
her negotiation with j having come to a halt.11
If the sum of the disagreement points in the negotiation between players
i and k exceeds the worth of that coalition, vik < tiki + t
ik
k , then u
ij
i = t
ik
i ,
and then the denition above implies that tiji = vi. In other words, if an
agreement between i and k is not viable, then when players i and j negotiate
they anticipate that if they do not reach an agreement then players j and
k will do so and share vjk with probability one, so that player is payo¤
will be vi.12 Thus, player is payo¤ when (hipothetically) dealing with k if
her negotiation with j are suspended coincides with her payo¤when dealing
with j under the same assumption, i.e., tiji .
iii) pij is (virtually) zero if uiki  uiji and ujkj  uijj , with one strict in-
11 In contrast to our approach, Benett (1997) assume that players i and j believe that
each one of them will be able to reach an agreement with player k with probability one,
in case negotiations between i and j fail.
12Note that if coalition (i; k) is not viable then uiki will not enter into the computations
of expected payo¤s, and will only matter in the determination of tiji :
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equality. That is, an agreement between players i and j cannot be reached
(with non-negligible probability) if both players prefer their alternative agree-
ment, one of them strictly.
Thus, we will build on the NBS by dening endogenous fallback options
for each negotiation. Often, our solution will predict that some coalition
would form with probability one, should the three-player coalition fail to
form. However, probability one events leave too many degrees of freedom
with respect to what are consistent outcomes in the rest of events. In order
to avoid this indeterminacy, we will proceed in the standard way of rst
considering only probability distributions that assign to each two-player ne-
gotiation a probability of success bounded away from 1.
Denition 1 For  > 0, an  Prediction for simultaneous, bilateral ne-
gotiations for the three-player game (N; v),  PSBN for short, is a triplen
uiji () ; t
ij
i () ; pij ()
o
i;j=1;2;3
that satises:
1)
uiji () =
(
1
2

vij + t
ij
i ()  tijj ()

if vij  tiji () + tijj () ;
tiki () otherwise;
2) tiji () = pij () t
ij
i () + pik ()u
ik
i () + pjk () vi, for all i; j; k;
3) p12 () + p13 () + p23 () = 1 ; pij ()  1    for all i; j; and for all
i; j; k, pij () <  if u
ij
i ()  uiki () and uijj ()  ujkj (), with one strict
inequality.
Our prediction for simultaneous, bilateral negotiations is the limiting
value of predictions as the upper bound on pij tends to 1.
Denition 2 A Prediction for simultaneous, bilateral negotiations for the
three-player game (N; v), PSBN for short, is a triple
n
uiji ; t
ij
i ; pij
o
i;j=1;2;3
that satises lim!0
n
uiji (); t
ij
i (); pij()
o
i;j=1;2;3
=
n
uiji ; t
ij
i ; pij
o
i;j=1;2;3
.
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Note that, implicit in the denition of a PSBN is that an  PSBN exists
for any  small, and also that
n
uiji (); t
ij
i (); pij()
o
converges to the same
values
n
uiji ; t
ij
i ; pij
o
independent of the path by which  converges to 0, or
the  PSBN selected for each . The next proposition, the main result of
this paper, states that these conditions are met. It also computes the PSBN.
In order to simplify the presentation of our results, we normalize vi = 0
for all i = 1; 2; 3, although we will still o¤er the denitions for the general
case. Also, at the end of this section we explain how all results and compu-
tations can be straightforwardly extended to the general case. Meanwhile,
payo¤s and disagreement points should be interpreted as net of one-player
coalitionspayo¤s.
Proposition 1 The PSBN exists for the game (N; v). Moreover,
(Region 1) if v12  v13 + v23 and v13  12v12, then p12 = 1, and u121 =
u122 =
1
2v12;
(Region 2) if v12  v13 + v23 and v13  12v12, then u121 = u131 = v13,
u122 = v12   v13,u133 = 0, p23 = 0 and if v13 < v12 then p12 = 1; and
(Region 3) if v12  v13 + v23 then uiji = uiki  ui = vij+vik vjk2 , for all
i; j; k, and pij  pij = uiuju1u2+u1u3+u2u3 :
Proof. See Appendix.
In regions 1 and 2, the surplus that players 1 and 2 obtain if they agree
is su¢ ciently high as compared to the alternative bilateral negotiations so
that we predict that players 1 and 2 "trade" with probability one (except in
the limit case of v12 = v13 where these two trades are equivalent). The way
they split the surplus depends on whether any player (player 1, given our
notation) has a su¢ ciently important alternative. In particular, our solution
concept conforms to the "outside option principle" (see Shaked and Sutton
1984, and Binmore, Shaked, and Sutton, 1989): the payo¤s of players 1
and 2 coincide with the NBS of their bilateral negotiation in isolation unless
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one has an outside option that is binding, in which case this player obtains
a payo¤ equal to that outside option. In a PSBN this outside option (for
a bilateral negotiation) is "endogenously" determined (by all simultaneous,
bilateral negotiations).13 In Region 3 the PSBN predicts that any of the
three bilateral negotiations may succeed. They all have positive probability
of success since all three players are indi¤erent among their two partners.
There are many situations where bilateral trade is the only feasible out-
come and side payments between the trading partners and the non trading
player are not feasible. In Section 4 we will discuss an application to merger
analysis that has this characteristic. In these cases, we claim that:
Remark 1 If the grand coalition cannot form then the PSBN is the right
solution concept.
The predicted outcome of bilateral negotiations determines the fallback
options in the three-player negotiation. Therefore, the last step in dening
a solution concept for the game (N; v), the R solution, is straightforward.
Denition 3 A R solution for the three-player game in characteristic form
(N; v) is a triple (U1; U2; U3) that satises: a) Ui = 13(V +2Ti Tj  Tk) for
all i; j; k, b) Ti = piju
ij
i + piku
ik
i + pjkvi, where
n
uiji ; t
ij
i ; pij
o
i;j=1;2;3
is the
PSBN for the game (N; v).
The grand coalition shares the surplus V   T1   T2   T3 according to
the generalized NBS (part a). Player i0s fallback option, Ti, is her expected
payo¤ in bilateral negotiations as computed from the PSBN (part b). Char-
acterizing this solution, in particular its existence and uniqueness, requires
characterizing
n
uiji ; t
ij
i ; pij
o
. This was done in Proposition 1. Therefore Ti,
13This is another di¤erence between the R solution and the concept(s) dened in Ben-
nett (1997). That is, by introducing coherent conjectures with respect to the probabilities
of success, we endogenously obtain the "outside option principle" as a natural outcome of
bagaining à la Nash.
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i = 1; 2; 3 exist and are unique, and then the proof of the following theorem
is straightforward.
Theorem 1 The R solution exists and is unique.
Computing the R solution is in fact extremely easy. What we o¤er below
can be considered a users manual. In regions 1 and 2 dened in Proposition
1, the PSBN predicts that players 1 and 2 would trade with probability 1.
Thus, the expected payo¤s for players 1 and 2 add up to v12 and player 3s
payo¤ is zero in both regions. These payo¤s are the disagreement payo¤s in
the three-player negotiation. Then in the R solution each player obtains
her disagreement payo¤ plus one third of any worth of the grand coalition
in excess of v12, if there is any.
In Region 3 all two-player coalitions have a positive probability to form,
should the grand coalition fail to agree. The PSBN satises some interesting
properties that make the computations simple. First, the payo¤ for a player
in each of the two-player coalitions of which she is a part is the same: uiji =
uiki = ui. Also, for each game there exists a number 	 such that
pijuk = 	 for all i; j; k: (1)
Note that pij is the probability that player k does not get uk. Therefore,
condition (1) indicates that the "loss" experienced by player i with respect
to the benchmark where she is able to secure ui with probability one, is the
same for all i = 1; 2; 3: This property drastically simplies the computation
of nal payo¤s. More specically, player i0s expected payo¤ in the PSBN is:
Ti = (pij + pik)ui = ui  	;
where we have used (1) in the last equality. As a result the R solution for
player i is given by:
Ui =
1
3
(V + 2Ti   Tj   Tk) = 1
3
(V + 2ui   uj   uk) :
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This makes it possible to compute the R solution without computing the
probabilities pij . Using Proposition 1 we obtain the nal expression:
Ui =
1
3
(V + vij + vik   2vjk) :
When vi 6= 0, all these computations carry through with only substitut-
ing vij vi vj for vij , for all i; j, and V  v1 v2 v3 for V , and also adding
vi to all values u; t; U and T . The following Table 1 contains the expression
for the R solution in this general case.
Table 1: The R solution
Region 1 Region 2 Region 3
U1
2V+v12+3v1 3v2 2v3
6 v13   4v33 + V v123 V+v12+v13 2v233
U2
2V+v12 3v1+3v2 2v3
6
2(v12 v13)
3 +
2
3v3 +
V v13
3
V+v12+v23 2v13
3
U3 v3 +
V v12 v3
3
2
3v3 +
V v12
3
V+v13+v23 2v12
3
Consider the case V = v12 + v3: Note that the non-participating player
(3) is able to appropriate a positive surplus (U3 > v3) only in Region 3. It
is precisely in this region where there is a potential bargaining coordination
problem and hence players 1 and 2 are willing to "bribe" player 3 out of the
way.
3 Properties of the R solution
In this section we study the properties of the R solution by discussing its
relation with key concepts in cooperative game theory: Shapley value, core,
bargaining set, and nucleolus.
The Shapley value and the R solution coincide only at two points of
the parameter space: v13 = v23 = 0 and v13 = v23 = v12.14 For the rest of
the parameter space, the comparison is straightforward and some regular-
ities can be noticed. With respect to the Shapley value, according to the
14 In the rst point (v13 = v23 = 0) the R solution coincides with the NBS of the game
for players 1 and 2. In this sense, both the Shapley value and the R solution are gener-
alizations of the NBS to the case of three players.
13
R solution: (i) Player 3s payo¤ is always lower, (ii) Player 2s payo¤ is
lower if and only if v13 is su¢ ciently high, (iii) Player 1s payo¤ is lower if
and only if both v13 and v23 are su¢ ciently small.15
In the next section we will use the predictions of these two solution con-
cepts to discuss investment incentives. This requires studying the marginal
e¤ect of an increase in the worth of a coalition on the payo¤s of the play-
ers that it contains. In contrast to the Shapley value (which is linear), the
R solution is piece-wise linear in the worth of di¤erent coalitions. In other
words, when we cross borders between regions, then the marginal e¤ect of
the worth of a coalition on payo¤s changes. For instance, if v13 < v122 (Region
1) then dU2dv12 =
1
2 ; but if v13 >
v12
2 (Region 2) then
dU2
dv12
= 1:
The Shapley value is the only value that satises the axioms of e¢ ciency,
symmetry, dummy player, and additivity (see for instance Winter, 2002).
That means that the R solution violates at least one of these axioms. The
R solution satises e¢ ciency, that is, for any game U1+U2+U3 = V . It also
satises symmetry. That is, if U is the R solution of (N; v) and U 0 is the
R solution of (N; v0) where v0(Z) = v(Z 0) and Z 0 = fi 2 N j(i) 2 Z g, for
some bijection  : N ! N then Ui = U 0(i) for all i 2 N . In other words, the
name of the player has no e¤ect on her value. Also, the R solution satises
the dummy axiom. That is, if v(S[i) v(S) = 0 for every S  N , then Ui =
0. Therefore, the R solution must violate the additivity axiom. Formally,
if (N; v) and (N; v0) are two games with solutions U and U 0 respectively, and
we consider the game (N; v00) where v00(Z) = v(Z) + v0(Z) for all Z  N , it
may be that its R solution U 00 does not satisfy U 00i = Ui + U 0i .
We will argue that for the class of problems that we are envisioning this
is a strength of the concept rather that a weakness.
15This discussion implies that the outcome predicted by the Shapley value does not
always Lorentz dominate the outcome predicted by the R solution. However, if we com-
pute, for instance, the variance of the outcomes, the Shapley value is always less disperse
than the R Solution. Thus, the Shapley value is more egalitarian in this sense.
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Example 1 One buyer, B, can trade with two potential sellers, S and
E. There are two goods and the buyer demands one unit of each. In the
production of the rst, S has a cost advantage, so that v(B;S) = 1 and
v(B;E) =  2  12 ; 1, whereas in the production of the second it is E who
has the cost advantage, so that v0(B;E) = 1 and v0(B;S) = . According to
the R solution, E obtains 0 in the rst game and 1 , in the second. The
game v00 = v+ v0 satises v00(B;E) = v00(B;S) = 1+, and v(B;S;E) = 2.
Additivity implies that player E, for instance, should still fetch 1  in
game v00. In fact, in v00 the R solution grants her one third of that amount.
Note that additivity amounts to assuming that the negotiations over the
two goods are conducted independently. Thus, by imposing additivity, as
the Shapley value does, we would be implicitly allowing sellers to commit to
negotiate over each of the two goods only through independent agents who
would not listen to anything related to the other good. The R solution
does not presume any ability of any party to preclude the two negotiations
to interact, and so does not assume such commitment power for any player.16
It is well known that the Shapley value is not necessarily in the core or
the bargaining set (BS) for the grand coalition. This is another di¤erence
between the R solution and the Shapley value or any probabilistic value.17
The following simple lemma simplies the discussion of these facts.
Lemma 1 For three-player, superadditive TU-games, the bargaining set of
16 In the previous example, the reader may conclude that the fact that S may also
supply the good for which it has a competitive disadvantage is a handicap. This is not so.
Consider the game ev = v00 except that ev(B;S) = 1. In this case, Ss payo¤ is still a third of
1  in the R Solution. Thus, the R solution, contrary to the Shapley value, implicitly
postulates that S has no commitment device stronger than simply this sort of "burning
the ships": destroying ones ability to deliver what is not going to be delivered. As this
example shows, this is in particular weaker, not stronger, than schemes like delegation to
independent agents.
17As shown by Weber (1988), a probabilistic value is e¢ cient only if it is a random-
order value, and in our superadditive setting e¢ ciency is a condition for an allocation to
be in the core. The set of all random-order values contains the core, but no single one is
"always" contained in the core even if we restrict attention to three player games.
15
the grand coalition coincides with the core if the latter is not empty. If the
core is empty, then the bargaining set of the grand coalition is a singleton.
The proof of this popular lemma is given in the Appendix. This lemma
allows us to consider only the relationship between the R solution and the
BS.
Proposition 2 The R solution belongs to the bargaining set (for the grand
coalition) and so to the core if the latter is not empty.
Proof. First, we study the core. An element of the core is a positive vector
(x1; x2; x3) such that: (i) x1 + x2 + x3 = V and (ii) xi + xj  vij for all i; j.
Adding up these last three conditions, we obtain x1+x2+x3  v12+v13+v232 ,
which combined with condition (i) gives:
V  v12 + v13 + v23
2
: (2)
When v12  v13+ v23, i.e., in Regions 1 and 2, this is satised trivially. It is
then immediate to check that the R solution satises (i) and (ii) in Regions
1 and 2. Thus, in Regions 1 and 2 the R solution belongs to the core and
then to the BS. In Region 3 the core may be empty, that is, (2) may not hold.
Thus, we will show that the R solution belongs to the BS. Remember that
in Region 3 Ui =
V+vij+vik 2vjk
3 . Since Ui  vi for all i, and since the grand
coalition cannot be part of an objection, we need only consider objections
that use two-player coalitions. Thus, consider an objection of i against j,
for i = 1; 2; 3, and j 6= i. That is, consider a division of vik, x = (xi; xk)
where k 6= i; j: xi + xk = vik, such that xi > Ui, and xk > Uk. We show
that there is a counter-objection of j, that is, a division y = (yj ; yk) of vjk
where yj + yk = vjk, such that yj  Uj and yk  xk. Consider in particular
yj = Uj , so that yk = vjk   Uj . If xi > Ui, then xk = vik   xi < vik   Ui.
But then
yk   xk > vjk   Uj   (vik   Ui) = 0:
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Thus, if x is an objection then y is a counter-objection. QED.
In Region 3, when V < v12+v13+v232 , since the BS is a singleton and the
R solution belongs to the BS, we conclude that the R solution coincides
with the BS, and so with any selection or subset of the BS, in particular the
nucleolus and the kernel (Nash set). We next discuss the R solution with
regard to these concepts and the "consistency" motivations behind them.
For the rest of this section, let us restrict attention to the case V = v12.
i.e., suppose that the grand coalition does not add surplus. In this domain,
the R solution can be characterized from a perhaps surprising perspective.
Indeed, let us label an allocation as the most egalitarian in a set if it Lorentz-
dominates the rest of allocations in the set.
Proposition 3 If V = v12, the R solution coincides with the selection of
the most egalitarian allocation in the bargaining set. Thus, it also coincides
with the selection of the most egalitarian allocation in the core, when the
core is not empty.
Proof. Note that U1  U2  U3. Thus, a more egalitarian allocation
would require to increase the payo¤ of player 3 or, at least, to increase the
payo¤ of player 2 by reducing the payo¤ of player 1. We show rst that in
Region 1 and Region 2 any allocation x in the BS or, equivalently in these
regions, in the core assigns a payo¤ x3 = 0. Assume otherwise x3 > 0. Then
x1+x2 = v12 x3 < v12, so that the allocation would not be in the core. This
immediately proves that the R solution is the most egalitarian allocation in
the BS for Region 1. Now suppose that we are in Region 2 and that there is
an allocation x that is more egalitarian than the R solution. Since x3 = 0,
this implies that x2 > v12  v13, so that x1 + x3 = v12   x2 < v13 violating
the conditions for x to be in the core. Thus, the R solution is the most
egalitarian allocation in the BS in Region 2. Finally, in Region 3 the core
is empty, so that the BS is a singleton. Thus, the R solution is the only
allocation in the BS. QED
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Thus, the R solution is the most egalitarian among the stable (in the
sense of Aumman-Maschler) allocations. That is, the most egalitarian among
the allocations that cannot be blocked in the sense of the (grand coalition)
BS.
An alternative selection in the BS is the nucleolus. For these games, the
nucleolus is also a selection of the kernel, itself a subset of the BS. Thus, as we
mentioned above, in Region 3 the four concepts, BS, nucleolus, kernel, and
R solution, coincide. In regions 1 and 2 and when v12 = V (the core is not
empty), the nucleolus is (x1; x2; x3) =
 
1
2(v12 + v13   v23); 12(v12 + v23   v13); 0

.18
Both the kernel and the Shapley value coincide with the NBS for two-
player, TU games. Moreover, each of the two concepts has been shown to be
the unique generalization of the NBS, in the sense that each satises a dif-
ferent concept of internal consistency (Serrano and Shimomura, 1998; Hart
and Mas-Colell, 1989).19 For the present discussion, the concept of internal
consistency means that if x = (x1; x2; x3) is the corresponding solution it
satises the following property: for any pair of players i; j, (xi; xj) is the NBS
of a reduced game (N 0; v0), where N 0 = fi; jg and v0(N 0) = xi+xj . The dif-
ference between the two consistency criteria lies in what v0(fig) and v0(fjg)
are. That is, the disagreement point in the reduced negotiation between i
and j. Keeping the normalization vi = 0, for the kernel (and nucleolus, since
for these games both concepts coincide), v0(fig) = maxfvik xk; 0g (Serrano
and Shimomura, 1998), whereas for the Shapley value v0(fig) = 12vik (Hart
and Mas-Colell, 1989). That is, in both cases if two players i; j bargain over
how to share the total that the solution allocates to them, xi+xj , they still
agree on the division (xi; xj), provided the disagreement point is as speci-
18See Leng and Parlar, 2010.
19Compte and Jehiel (2010) dene another extension of the NBS, the Coalitional Nash
Bargaining Solution, as the allocation that maximizes the product of payo¤s in the core.
Note that, with three players and v12 = V , all core allocations give a product of payo¤s
equal to 0. When the core contains an interior (which requires V > v12), the Coalitional
Nash Bargaining Solution and the most egalitatian selection of the core coincide. Yet the
R solution is not the most egalitarian selection in this case.
18
ed. This latter point is the crucial di¤erence between the kernel and the
Shapley value on one hand, and the R solution on the other. Just like in
the concepts proposed by Bennett (1997), neither of the disagreement pay-
o¤s for the negotiation between i and j dened above come from a feasible,
alternative agreement. For instance, for i; j = 1; 2, the disagreement point
that sustains the kernel is (v13; v23) and the one that sustains the Shapley
value is (v132 ;
v23
2 ). Although they imply a di¤erent division of the surplus
with player 3, in both cases the disagreement payo¤s result from player 1
and also player 2 "trading" with player 3. But those two trades are mu-
tually exclusive, and in that sense playersexpectations are not consistent.
Instead, in the R solution, if two players i; j bargain over how to share
their total payo¤, Ui + Uj , they still agree on the division (Ui; Uj) provided
that the disagreement point is a lottery over the payo¤s (vik   Uk; 0) and
(0; vjk   Uk), where the lottery is part of the solution. That is, the NBS
and the R solution are also consistent, but in a way that is itself based on
consistently computed disagreement points.20
4 Applications
In this section we study in some detail how our solution concept changes the
predictions of well-known Industrial Organization models in which bargain-
ing among three players plays a crucial role. We start with a model (Segal
and Whinston, 2000) that ts perfectly within the set of games considered
in previous sections. Next, we discuss an example (Horn and Persson, 2001)
where bilateral agreements generate externalities (the worth of an individual
coalition depends on whether or not the other two players reach an agree-
ment). We argue that the R solution can also be applied to this type of
games (partition function form) by simply taking into account the value of
20 In Region 3, all concepts coincide. The reason is that in that case the "feasible"
disagreement point and the "infeasible" one lie on the same 45 degree line in the payo¤
space for any pair i; j.
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individual coalitions conditional on the agreement between the other two
players. Moreover, in this example the grand coalition cannot form and
hence in this case the natural solution concept is not the R solution but
the PSBN. Finally, we argue that the ideas contained in the R solution can
easily be extended to match the three-player example discussed by Hart and
Moore (1990). The main issue in this example is that bilateral trades are
not mutually exclusive.
4.1 Exclusive contracts
Segal and Whinston (2000), SW, study the impact of exclusive contracts.
Their main insight is that an exclusive contract enhances the ability of the
incumbent seller to capture rents in the ex-post bargaining game, but it is
irrelevant in protecting his relation-specic investment, unless such invest-
ment generates an externality on the entrant. This is a somewhat counter
intuitive result that contradicts the conventional wisdom (see, for instance,
Klein, 1988, Marvel, 1982, or Masten and Sneyder, 1993).
Here we discuss a version of the model presented in their Section 2.
There are three players B;S; and E: Player B (buyer) derives a potential
utility of 1 from one unit of the good that can be provided by either S (the
incumbent seller) or by E (the entrant). There are three periods: 0; 1; and 2.
In period 0, S and B may or may not sign an exclusive contract. In period
1, player S takes a costly investment decision, x 2 [0; 1], which a¤ects the
incumbent sellers costs. Also in period 1, once x is xed, players learn the
realization of a random variable y 2 [0; 1], which inuences the entrants
cost and is distributed according to the cumulative function H (y) and has
expectation by. In period 2 production and trade take place, and players
receive their payo¤s. Players S and E can produce one unit of the good at a
cost cs (x) and ce (y), respectively. For simplicity, we assume cs (x) = 1  x
and ce (y) = 1   y. If in period 0 players S and B had signed an exclusive
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contract, then in period 2 player B cannot purchase from E without Ss
permission. In both cases, with and without an exclusive contract, B;S; and
E bargain in period 2 about who produces the good and how the surplus is
distributed.
In their general model SW use a generalization of the Shapley value as
the solution concept for the renegotiation in period 2: As an illustration of
their ideas let us apply the Shapley value to the above simple version of
their model.21
In the absence of any contract, the worth of various coalitions is as
follows:
V = max fx; yg ; vSB = x; vBE = y: (3)
The rest of coalitions have a worth of 0. Under the exclusive contract, the
only di¤erence is that vBE = 0:
According to the Shapley value, without exclusivity S0s payo¤ equals
UneS =
1
3 max fx  y; 0g + x6 : Thus, Ss marginal return on investment is
1
3H (x)+
1
6 : Note that the marginal return on investment for the pair (B;S)
is 23H (x) +
1
3 . Hence, from the point of view of the pair (B;S) there is
underinvestment (the classic hold up problem).
Surprisingly, under the Shapley value an exclusive contract does not help
reducing the underinvestment problem. More specically, under exclusivity
player Ss payo¤ is equal to U eS =
1
3 max fx; yg+ x6 and the marginal return
on investment is also 13H (x) +
1
6 :
22
Conclusion 1 Under the Shapley value, an exclusive contract does not af-
fect investment incentives.
21 In their Section 2, SW consider the case of a competitive entrant who is willing to
supply the good at a price pe = 1   y; and given such an outside option players B and
S engage in bargaining and the outcome is determined by the NBS. It turns out that
exclusivity is also neutral with respect to investment incentives.
22The marginal social return on investment is H (x) : Hence, the equilibrium level of
investment may be below or above the rst best level.
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It is important to emphasize that the neutrality result hinges on the
specic way the Shapley value is computed. An exclusive contract only
changes player Ss payo¤by changing his marginal contribution to the grand
coalition. In the absence of exclusivity S0s marginal contribution to the
grand coalition is max fx  y; 0g and under exclusivity it is max fx; yg : The
di¤erence between these two values is y: Hence, under exclusivity S0s payo¤
increases by 13y (where
1
3 is the weight of the grand coalition in payo¤s), but
Ss marginal return on investment remains unchanged.
Let us now analyze the same problem when we use the R solution to
predict payo¤s in period 2. In this case, player Ss payo¤ is
Unes =
8<:
x
2 ; if y  x2
x  y; if x  y  x2
0; if x < y
Thus, Ss marginal return on investment is H (x)   12H
 
x
2

. Once again,
there is underinvestment from the point of view of the pair (B;S): the mar-
ginal return on investment for the pair (B;S) is equal to min fH (2x) ; 1g :
Under exclusivity, player Ss payo¤ is the same that we found when we
used the Shapley value:
U eS =

x
2 ; if y  x;
x
6 +
y
3 , if y  x:
Thus, Ss marginal return on investment is 13H (x) +
1
6 . Therefore, under
exclusivity investment incentives may be enhanced or depressed with respect
to the no contract case.
Note that under exclusivity the R solution and the Shapley value coin-
cide. Hence, we need to understand why these two solution concepts deliver
di¤erent payo¤s in the absence of a contract. In the latter case, if y > x
the Shapley value grants player S a payo¤ of x6 . If we think in terms of
the sequential arrival interpretation of the Shapley value, such payo¤ results
from the fact that S makes a positive contribution in case he arrives second
after player B. However, according to the R solution player S is redundant
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and should get a zero payo¤ (he is player 3 and the only thing that he might
do is to inuence the way y is split between B and E). Thus, under the
R solution incentives to invest will be enhanced if y > x is a likely sce-
nario; i.e., if investment costs are relatively high so that x is low. However,
if x2 < y < x then player Ss marginal contribution to the coalition with B
is x (weight 16) and the marginal contribution to the grand coalition is x  y
(weight 13). Hence, according to the Shapley value S is able to appropriate
one half of his investment e¤orts. In contrast, the R solution grants player
S a payo¤ of x y (in this case player S is player 2), and hence he is able to
appropriate the entire return on investment. Thus, under the R solution
incentives to invest are depressed if x2 < y < x is a likely scenario; i.e., if in-
vestment costs are relatively low and x is high. In this case, the paradoxical
result obtained by SW is magnied.23
Conclusion 2 Under the R solution, an exclusive contract enhances in-
vestment incentives if the cost of investment is relatively high, but the oppo-
site holds if the cost is relatively low.
In other words, under theR solution exclusivity helps protecting relation-
specic investments only when the sellers competitive position is su¢ ciently
weak. Exclusivity is useful only when there is a lot to protect.24,25
4.2 Endogenous mergers
Horn and Persson (2001), HP, present a model of endogenous merger for-
mation. Here we focus on the example discussed in their Section 2.1, which
23 If y < x
2
Ss marginal return on investment is equal to 1
2
; under both the Shapley
value and the R solution.
24 If investment costs are su¢ ciently high (x low) ; then the level of investment under
exclusivity is ine¢ ciently high. In other words, from a social point of view an exclusive
contract may actually overprotect relation-specic investments.
25De Meza and Selvaggi (2007) also show that SWs conclusions are not robust to
changes in the solution concept for the bargaining game. They set up a non-cooperative
bargaining game that delivers di¤erent predictions than the R solution and show that
exclusivity always enhances investment incentives.
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considers a market initially populated by three oligopolistic rms, 1, 2, and
3. They are allowed to merge, but not to form a monopoly. In other words,
there are four possible market structures: no merger, 1 and 2 merge, 1
and 3 merge, and 2 and 3 merge. Although rms are symmetric before
any merger, the synergies generated by alternative mergers are asymmetric.
Firmsprots in the no merger case are normalized to 0. Prots of the rm
resulting from the merger between rms i and j, and the non-merged rm
k are denoted by ij and k respectively and are:
12 = 70; 3 = 50;
13 = 100; 2 = 0;
23 = 90; 1 = 5:
In previous sections we dened the R solution for games in character-
istic form, where the value of a coalition is independent of the agreements
reached by players not included in the coalition. However, in HP the value
of stand-alone coalitions do depend on whether or not the other two play-
ers have reached an agreement. Thus, this model can be described as a
game in partition function form (Lucas and Thrall, 1963). In a three-player
game, we need to specify what player i can obtain if no coalition is formed,
wiffig;fjg;fkgg; and what player i obtains if the other two players do form a
coalition, wiffig;fj;kgg. Myerson (1977) extended the Shapley value for par-
tition function form games. In his extension, player is payo¤ depends on
both, wiffig;fjg;fkgg and w
i
ffig;fj;kgg. On the contrary, the denition of the
R solution already takes into account possible externalities. The stand-
alone worth plays a role only in the denition of the values tiji and t
ik
i .
These values are obtained as a probability distribution over the events that
can be expected as an alternative to i forming coalition with j or k, re-
spectively. The only such event that has i standing alone is the formation
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of coalition fj; kg. Thus, only wiffig;fj;kgg matters, and then vi should be
interpreted as this value. Summarizing:
Remark 2 The R solution dened for games in characteristic form can
also be applied to games in partition function form, simply by replacing
the worth of individual coalitions, vi, with the worth of individual coalitions
conditional on the other two players forming a coalition, wiffig;fj;kgg:
The net surplus created by each merger is given by:
12   1   2 = 65;
13   1   3 = 45;
23   2   3 = 35:
Thus, the most e¢ cient merger (from the point of view of rmsprots)
is the one between rms 1 and 2. HP use as a solution concept the set of
market structures that are not dominated from the point of view of decisive
players. In other words, in an Equilibrium Ownership Structure (EOS ) the
sum of prots achieved by all decisive players must be at least as high as
in any other market structure. Since in this example all players are decisive
when we compare alternative duopolies (all rms have a di¤erent position
in each possible market structure resulting from a merger) then the only
market structure which is undominated is the resulting from the merger
between rms 1 and 2: In other words, HP predict that the most e¢ cient
market structure will occur with certainty.
Conclusion 3 Under the notion of Equilibrium Ownership Structure the
e¢ cient merger occurs with probability one.
HP do not allow any transfer between the merged and non-merged rms.
Hence, since the grand coalition cannot be formed, we cannot directly ap-
ply the R solution to this particular model. However, we can still predict
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the outcome of simultaneous bilateral negotiations (PSBN). Note that this
example lies in Region 3 (12   1   2 < 13   1   3 + 23   2   3).
Thus, using the PSBN we predict that the e¢ cient merger will take place
with probability less than one. In fact, conditional on being part of the
successful coalition, players obtain: u1 = 30, u2 = 40, u3 = 60, and the
probability that the merger between 1 and 2 is successful is given by:
p12 =
(u1   1) (u2   2)P3
i<j;i;j=1 (ui   i) (uj   j)
=
21
34
:
According to our solution concept, the probability that an ine¢ cient
merger takes place is almost forty per cent. When all three mergers gen-
erate substantial surpluses and side payments to rms not participating in
the merger are not feasible, then our theory predicts that there may exist a
bargaining coordination problem: any deal that rms 1 and 2 may attempt
to strike can be credibly challenged by rm 3. Thus, there are gains from
forming the grand coalition and avoiding such coordination problems. How-
ever, this would require side payments, which may not be feasible in the
context of mergers.
Conclusion 4 Under the PSBN, any merger (including ine¢ cient ones)
may occur with positive probability.
4.3 Allocation of property rights
Hart and Moore (1990), HM, study how the allocation of property rights
over assets a¤ects the ex-post relative bargaining position of di¤erent play-
ers, which in turn determines ex-ante incentives to undertake asset-specic
investments. The example discussed in Section 4.1 is actually closely re-
lated to HMs ideas. As noted by SW, their own insights on the neutrality
of exclusive contracts can be interpreted as an application of HMs theory.
More specically, assume that there exists one asset a and let v (Z; a j x) and
v (Z;? j x) be the worth of coalition Z, conditional on investment x, when
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Z can and when Z cannot use the asset, respectively. Then, the example
discussed in Section 4.1 can be written as follows:
v (fS;Bg ; a j x) = v (fS;Bg ;? j x) = x;
v (fE;Bg ; a j x) = y;
v (fS;B;Eg ; a j x) = max fx; yg ; (4)
and v (;  j x) = 0 for all x in all other cases. That is, Bs ownership of the
asset is equivalent to the no contract situation in SW, and Ss ownership
corresponds to S and B having signed an exclusivity contract. In the lan-
guage of HM, player B is an indispensable player: the marginal return on
investment for members of coalitions that do not contain B is independent
on whether or not the asset is used. Also, player S is the only one who
takes an investment decision. According to Propositions 2 and 6 in HM,
incentives to invest are identical when player B and when player S have the
property rights over the asset. As shown in Section 4.1 this result holds
when we use the Shapley value as the solution concept, but not when we
use the R solution.26
Let us take this discussion one step further. Suppose that we replace (4)
by:
v (fS;B;Eg ; a j x) = x+ y: (5)
We can interpret this game as one where the cost of producing the good can
be reduced with respect to the cost of either of the two sellers if the two
of them cooperate. In this game, the same conclusions apply: HMs results
are not robust to the application of the R solution, and incentives to invest
depend on whether the indispensable player, B, or the investor, S, own the
asset. However, this game admits a di¤erent interpretation along the lines of
HMs famous introductory example. Indeed, as in HM, let the three players
26De Meza and Loockwood (1998) and Chiu (1998) also show that HMs conclusions
are not robust to changes in the solution concept for the bargaining game.
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B, S, and E be a tycoon, a chef, and a skipper, respectively. Also, let the
single asset be a yacht. The chef is able to o¤er a service in the yacht worth x
to the tycoon. Similarly, the skipper is able to o¤er a service in the yacht
worth y to the tycoon. Hence, there are two possible trades. If these two
trades are mutually exclusive (the tycoon can enjoy a dinner in the yacht
or enjoy sailing, but not both) then the value of the grand coalition is well
represented by (4) and, under the R solution, investment incentives change
when we transfer property rights between the tycoon and the skipper. On
the other hand, it could be that these two trades are not incompatible, and
may take place simultaneously, as HM assume in their introduction. The
di¤erence would be irrelevant if we apply the Shapley value, since all relevant
information is already contained in the characteristic function, which has not
changed. More specically, under (5) if the tycoon owns the yacht then the
Shapley value grants the chef a payo¤ of 12x, and if the chef owns the yacht
he receives a payo¤ of 12x+
1
3y: Consequently:
Conclusion 5 Under the Shapley value investment incentives do not change
if we transfer property rights from an indispensable player to the player un-
dertaking investment.
Shouldnt payo¤s depend on whether the two trades are compatible
or not? The R solution, as dened in Section 2, is a solution concept
only for games where bilateral trades are mutually exclusive. In an arti-
cle in progress, we extend the denition to more general cases, that in-
clude this example by HM with compatible bilateral trades. The main gen-
eralization is the denition of feasible events, a subset of the power set
of f(1; 2); (1; 3); (2; 3)g. An event describes the outcome of bilateral ne-
gotiations. For instance, the event [(1; 2); (1; 3)] corresponds to 1 agree-
ing to trade with 2 and 1 also agreeing to trade with 3. If we represent
with square brackets the events, in this paper the set of feasible events
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was f[(1; 2)]; [(1; 3)]; [(2; 3)]g. In the example of HM, the set of events is
f[(1; 2); (1; 3)]; [(1; 2)]; [(1; 3)]; [(2; 3)]g). That is, it contains the new event
[(1; 2); (1; 3)]. In a case like that, the extended  PSBN would still be a
triple
n
uiji () ; t
ij
i () ; p ()
o
except that p () is a probability distribution
over the set of feasible events. That is, over four events. For our present
purpose, let us keep the notation pij () for the event [(i; j)], and add p ()
to denote the probability of event [(1; 2); (1; 3)]. Then, condition 1 in the
denition of  PSBN remains unchanged. For condition 2 we need to in-
troduce the concept of mutually excluding pairs. Pairs (i; j) and (k; l) are
mutually excluding if there is no feasible event that contains both. In the
previous sections, all three pairs were mutually excluding with each other.
In the present example, however, (1; 2) and (2; 3) are mutually excluding,
as (1; 3) and (2; 3), but (1; 2) and (1; 3) are not. The relation is symmetric.
Then condition 2 in the denition of an  PSBN reads that tiji () equals the
expected payo¤ for player i in pairs that are mutually excluding with (i; j),
conditional on events that do not contain (i; j). In the present example,
dropping the index  for clarity,
t1ii =
p23u
23
i
1  (p+ p1i) ;
for i = 2; 3. On the other hand, since (1; 3) and (1; 2) are not mutually
excluding, and 1 is not in the pair (2; 3), we have t1i1 = 0. Also,
t23i =
(p+ p1i)u
1i
i
1  p23 ;
for i = 2; 3.
Finally, condition 3, still dropping the index , should now include p12+
p13 + p23 + p = 1 and the probability of a trade between players i and j
cannot be higher than 1  for all i; j.27 But now, the probability of an event
should not be larger than  if all players that are part of a pair included in
27 In particular, p+ p12; p+ p13; and p23 all must be lower or equal than 1  :
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that event obtain a higher payo¤ (one of them strictly so) in some other
event. In the present example u121 + u
13
1  u1i1 for i = 1; 2. Thus, p   if
u121 + u
13
1 = u
1i
1 (which implies u
1j
1 = 0 for j 6= i), and u1ii < u23i for i = 2; 3.
Also, p23   if u122  u232 and u133  u233 , with one strict inequality. Finally,
p1i   for i = 1; 2 if u1j1 > 0 for j 6= i, or u121 = u131 = 0 and u23i > u1ii .
With this denition of an  PSBN, we can dene the PSBN and the
R solution for this more general case, just as in Section 2.
Remark 3 If the two most e¢ cient trades f(1; 2) ; (1; 3)g can occur simul-
taneously and V = v12 + v13, then the R solution exists and is unique. In
particular, p = 1, U1 = v12+v132 , and Ui =
v1i
2 , for i = 2; 3.
The proof can be found in the Appendix.
Now we are ready to apply the R solution to the example in HM with
non-exclusive bilateral trades. It turns out that, in this case, the R solution
and the Shapley value o¤er the same prediction:
Conclusion 6 Under the R solution and two compatible trades, invest-
ment incentives do not change when we transfer property rights from the
indispensable player to the one undertaking investment.
In contrast to the Shapley value, in order to apply the R solution we
need a more complete description of the game: besides the characteristic
function we need to know which bilateral trades are compatible. In the
previous sections we focused in the simplest case where all bilateral trades
are mutually excluding. In this section we have shown that the ideas behind
the R solution can be extended to encompass more general situations. The
payo¤s predicted by the R solution are sensitive to the set of alternatives
to the grand coalition, i.e., sensitive to which bilateral trades are compatible
and which ones are not. In particular, this set of alternatives to the grand
coalition will a¤ect whether HMs results hold or not under the R solution.
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5 Concluding remarks
In this paper we provide a new solution concept for three-player bargain-
ing games, the R solution, that can be interpreted as a generalization of
the NBS with endogenous disagreement points. In particular, our solu-
tion identies the outcomes of negotiations within any possible coalition,
not only the grand coalition, and disagreement points in each negotiation
are determined by consistent conjectures on the consequences of suspending
that negotiation. These conjectures include a (probabilistic) prediction of
what alternative negotiation will succeed in that case. We show that the
R solution always exists and is unique. Moreover, it belongs to the core if
it is non-empty. In general, it belongs to the Aumann-Machlers bargaining
set.
It turns out that the consistency requirement behind the R solution
causes this concept to conform with the "outside option principle" (see Bin-
more, Shaked, and Sutton, 1989) for bilateral negotiations. Indeed, when
her endogenously determined fallback option is binding in a bilateral ne-
gotiation, a players payo¤ in that negotiation is predicted to coincide with
that fallback option. Otherwise, the option does not a¤ect her payo¤. Thus,
although the noncooperative implementation of the R solution is beyond
the scope of this paper, protocols in the spirit of this principle should be
appropriate instruments for this goal.28
Our solution concept is motivated by simultaneous bilateral negotiations
that are mutually exclusive. That is, we allow for the grand coalition to add
value, but absent an agreement in the grand coalition, the alternative is that
one, and no more than one, two-player coalition forms and realizes its worth.
It is not di¢ cult to think of examples where this is not the case. We have
discussed one such case, the famous skipper-chef-tycoon example in Hart and
28For instance, it is easy to check that in the three-player/three-cake game when v23 = 0,
the "auctioning" protocol discussed in Binmore, Osborne and Rubinstein (1992) imple-
ments the R solution as the limit when delay approaches zero.
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Moore (1990) paper. In the spirit of our solution concept, the set of possible
events when the grand coalition fails to form should inuence the way parties
share the surplus if the grand coalition does form. In a companion paper,
we extend the R solution for games with any such set of possible events. In
general, the information contained in the characteristic function of a game
is not su¢ cient to determine that set. Therefore concepts that are dened
on only the information contained in the characteristic function, like the
Shapley value, will be insensitive to variations in the set of possible events.
The study of games involving more than three players poses new ques-
tions that are not present in the current analysis. One set of such questions
has to do with the hierarchy of coalitions and is related to the discussion in
the previous paragraph. As we have just mentioned, in this paper we have
assumed that if the grand coalition breaks down then only one trade between
two players can be realized. In fact, there are three alternative two-player
coalitions and each one of them is expected to strike a deal with certain
probability. Therefore, computing the fallback option of each player in each
coalition is relatively straightforward. However, in a four-player game, if the
grand coalition fails then the relevant alternatives are not so easy to obtain
even if we impose that only disjoint coalitions can form. The alternative to
the grand coalition may be a one three-player coalition, excluding the fourth
player but it may also be two disjoint two-player coalitions. Specifying the
fallback option of a particular player in an arbitrary coalition can still be
done along the lines discussed in Subsection 4.3, but it involves a higher
degree of complexity. We leave the analysis of games with more than three
players for future research.
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7 Appendix
7.1 Proof of Proposition 1:
First we propose an  PSBN for the game (N; v) for  small enough. This
will show existence. To save in notation, we will dispose of the () index of
the solution, and specify if we refer to the limit instead.
1) Let 12v12  v13.
1.a) If 12v12 > v13 (so that v12  v13 + v23 is also satised), consider
u121 = u
12
2 =
1
2v12, and u
ij
i = 0 for all other values of i; j. Also, let p12 = 1 ,
p13 = p23 =

2 . Finally, let t
12
1 = t
12
2 = t
i3
3 = 0 and t
i3
i =
1 
2 v12 for i = 1; 2.
Note that lim!0 1 2 v12 =
1
2v12 > v13  v13. Thus, for  su¢ ciently small,
this satises the denition of an  PSBN.
1.b) If 12v12 = v13 > v23, consider u
12
1 = u
12
1 =
1
2v12 (= v13), and
u232 = u
23
3 = 0. Also, let p12 = 1    and p13 = 0, p23 = . Then, t121 =
t233 = t
12
2 = t
13
3 = 0 and t
23
2 =
1
2v12 > v23. To complete the denition of an
 PSBN we need only t131 = (1   )12v12, u131 = 12(v13 + t131   t133 ) = (1 

2)v13 and u
13
3 =

2v13.
1.c) If v13 = v23 = 12v12, consider u
12
1 = u
12
2 =
1
2v12 (= vi3, i = 1; 2),
p12 = 1    and p13 = p23 = 2 . Then ti3i = (1 )v122  < vi3, i = 1; 2. Also,
consider u133 = u
23
3 = A > 0. Thus, t
i3
3 , i = 1; 2, will have to satisfy:
ti33 =
A
2   ; and
A =
1
2

vi3   (1  )v12
2   +
A
2  

;
and solving for A taking into account that 12v12 = vi3, we obtain
A =
vi3
4  3 ;
which is smaller than vi3 for small . Note that for  small ti33 + t
i3
i < vi3,
i = 1; 2. Also, note that given these values for ui3i , we should dene t
12
1 =
t122 =

2
(vi3 A)
 =
(v12 2A)
4 , and t
12
1 + t
12
2 < v12. This satises the denition
of an  PSBN.
2) If v12  v13 + v23 but v13 > 12v12, then consider u121 = u131 = u1, to
be obtained later, with 0 < u1 < v13, and u232 = u
23
3 = 0. Thus, u
12
2 =
v12   u1 > u232 and u133 = v13   u1 > u233 . Consequently, let p23 = . Then
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p12 = 1    p13. Finally, u232 = u233 = 0 implies that t122 = t133 = 0, and we
can then check that t122 + t
12
2 < v12, whereas
t131 + t
13
3 =
p12u
12
2
1   +
p13u
13
3
1  
= (v12   u1)  p13(v12   v13)
1   :
We will propose u1 su¢ ciently close to v13 so that t131 + t
13
3  v13. In that
case, u should satisfy
u1 =
1
2
(v13 +
(1    p13)u1
1  p13 ) =
1
2
(v12 +
p13u1
+ p13
):
This is a system of two equations with two unknowns. Note that if we have
a (valid) solution to this system, then as  approaches 0 the rst equation
approaches u1 = 12(v13+u1) whose only solution is v13 = u1. (For positive ,
indeed u1 < v13.) Thus, for  small enough, t131 +t
13
3 < v12 u1 = v12 2v13+
v13 + (v13   u1) and the right hand side converges to v12   2v13 + v13 < v13.
Also, solving for u1, we can write the system as
v13

1 +

p13 + 

= v12

1 +

1  p13

:
This is a quadratic equation in p13 with one positive root that converges to
0 as  converges to zero. Thus, we have an  PSBN for  small enough.
And for  small, p12 is close to 1.
3) If v12 < v13+v23, then propose u
ij
i = u
ik
i = ui > 0, for all i; j; k. Then
the denition of uiji requires that ui + uj = vij for all i; j. This is a system
of three linear (independent) equations with solution ui =
vij+vik vjk
2 . Also,
tiji =
pikui
1 pij . Finally, p should satisfy
ui =
1
2
(vij +
pikui
pik + pjk
  pjkuj
pik + pjk
)
for all i; j; k. Taking into account ui + uj = vij , these equations can be
written as
 p13u2 + p23u1 = 0;
 p12u3 + p13u2 = 0;
 p12u3 + p23u1 = 0:
Note that the third equation is simply the sum of the previous two. That
is, there are only two linearly independent equations. Thus, two of these
equations plus p13 + p23 + p23 = 1 form a linear system with a unique
solution. The solution is a probability distribution, since all three variables
take positive values. Indeed, the rst two equations can be written as p13u1 =
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p23
u2
and p12u2 =
p13
u3
, so that all solution vectors to these two equations have
either all positive components or all negative. And no solution with all
negative components satises the equation p13+p23+p23 = 1. Finally, note
that tijj + t
ij
i =
pjkuj
pjk+pik
  pikuipjk+pik , so that since both uj ; ui < vij , indeed t
ij
j +
tiji < vij .
This concludes the proof of existence. Next, we can simply check that
if we select the  PSBN that we have just characterized for each possi-
ble values of vij for all ij, then the lim!0 fu(); t(); p()g is as stated in
the Proposition. Thus, we only need showing that there is no other triple
fu; t; pg that is the limit of a sequence of  PSBN as  approaches 0. First
we prove a handy result.
Lemma 2 In a  PSBN, cycles cannot occur. That is, it cannot be that
uiji  uiki ; ujkj  uijj ; uikk  ujkk for some values of i; j; k. Moreover, uiji =
uiki ; u
jk
j = u
ij
j ; u
ik
k = u
jk
k can only occur if v12  v13 + v23.
Proof of Lemma: First, assume that we have such cycle with at least
one strict inequality, and such that tiji + t
ij
j  vij for all ij. In any such
cycle, uiji =
1
2

vij + t
ij
i   tijj

for all i; j; k. Substituting for vij = u
ij
i + u
ij
j ,
and also substituting for
tiji =
pik
1  pij u
ik
i (6)
we can write this expression as
(uiji   uijj )(1  pij) = pikuiki   pjkujkj (7)
Adding these three equations, for all three pairs, this implies that
(uiji   uijj ) + (uikk   uiki ) + (ujkj   ujkk ) = 0;
that is, uiji + u
ik
k + u
jk
j = u
ij
j + u
ik
i + u
jk
k , which violates the inequalities
dening the cycle if there is one that is strict.
Second, assume that tiji + t
ij
j > vij for some ij, but t
ik
i + t
ik
k  vik, and
tjkj + t
jk
k  vjk. Given the cycle, this implies that uiji = uijj = uiki = 0, so
that also uikk = vik. Thus, equations (7) for the pair jk become
(ujkj   ujkk )(1  pjk) =  pikvik.
Since pjk < 1, that implies u
jk
k  ujkj . Note, however, that tjkj = 0, since
uijj = 0, so that u
jk
j  ujkk . These two inequalities then imply both ujkj =
ujkk =
vjk
2 , and pik = 0. Since the cycle inequalities include u
ik
k  ujkk , then
we must have vik  vjk2 . But substituting for ujkk =
vjk
2 and pik = 0 in
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(6) corresponding to tikk , we also have that t
ik
k = pjk
vjk
2 <
vjk
2  vik. This
contradicts that uikk = vik.
Third, assume that tiji + t
ij
j > vij and t
ik
i + t
ik
k > vik for some ij and ik
but tjkj + t
jk
k  vjk. That implies that uiji = uijj = uiki = uikk = 0, which
implies that tjkj = t
jk
k = 0, so that u
jk
k =
vjk
2 > u
ik
k , which contradicts the
inequalities in the cycle.
Thus, the only cycle that may exist is uiji = u
ik
i ; u
jk
j = u
ij
j ; u
ik
k = u
jk
k ,
with tiji + t
ij
j  vij for all ij. But the system ui + uj = vij , for all ij has
a valid solution only in Region 3, and coincides with the one found above.
QED
Thus, an  PSBN must satisfy:
uiji  uiki ;ujkj  uijj ;uikk  ujkk ; (8)
and except for the one we used in 3) above, at least two inequalities must
be strict. Also, given part three of the denition of  PSBN, pik <  unless
uiji = u
ik
i and u
ik
k = u
jk
k . Thus, in any but the  PSBN constructed in 3)
above, pik < . Thus, in a sequence that converges as ! 0, we must have
lim!0 pik = 0.
Consider such a sequence of  PSBN so that lim!0 pij > 0 and lim!0 pjk >
0. From (8) and part three of the denition of  PSBN, that implies that
for  small uijj = u
jk
j . Thus, since at least two inequalities need to be strict,
uiji > u
ik
i and u
ik
k < u
jk
k . These last inequalities imply that u
jk
k + u
jk
j = vjk
and uiji + u
ij
j = vij . Also, as  approaches 0,
pjk
pjk+pik
approaches 1, as does
pij
pij+pik
, so that applying part one of the denition of a  PSBN,
uijj = u
jk
j ! uj =
1
2
(vij + uj) =
1
2
(vjk + uj) :
This cannot occur unless vij = vjk. In the latter case, uj = vij = vjk, which
implies that both uiji and u
jk
k converge to 0, and so t
ik
i + t
ik
k converges to 0,
in which case uiki converges to
vik
2 > u
ij
i for  small and when vik > 0. This
is a contradiction unless vik = 0. But if vij = vjk, vik = 0, the limit of such
a sequence coincides with the  PSBN constructed in 3) above.
Thus, we must have that both lim!0 pik = 0, and either lim!0 pjk = 0
or lim!0 pij = 0. But if lim!0 pij = 0 then lim!0 pjk > 0, and this con-
tradicts part 3 of the denition of an  PSBN since uiji  uiki and uijj  ujkj
with at least one inequality. Thus, assume that lim!0 pik = lim!0 pjk = 0.
We consider two possible cases:
1) Assume that tjkj + t
jk
k > vjk in all the terms of the sequence
29 as 
converges to 0, so that ujkj = u
jk
k = 0 = t
ij
j , for each  small enough in the
29Note, in general, that except in trivial cases, either this is satised for  close to 0 or
else the sequence cannot converge.
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sequence considered. Thus, from (8), we must also have that uikk = 0. Since
only one inequality in (8) may be non strict, and ujkk = u
ik
k we must have
uiji > u
ik
i , and since u
jk
j = 0, we must also have that u
ij
j > u
jk
j . These two
inequalities imply that uiji + u
ij
j = vij . Since t
ij
j = 0, we must then have
that uiji  vij2 . Thus:
1.a) If vij2 > vik, since t
ik
i converges to u
ij
i  vij2 , then for  small we
must also have that tiki + t
ik
k > vik, so that u
ik
i = 0, and then t
ij
j = t
ij
i = 0,
and then uijj = u
ij
i =
vij
2 . Note that t
jk
j  uijj and tjkk = 0. Thus, for
tjkj + t
jk
k > vjk, it must be that
vij
2 > vjk. This requires that ij = 1; 2 and
also that we are in Region 1. Thus, the limit of such sequence is the one
stated in the Proposition.
1.b) If vij2  vik, as before, if tiki + tikk > vik, then uijj =
vij
2 , and since
tikk = 0, this would imply that
vij
2  tiki > vik which is a contradiction. Thus,
we must have tiki + t
ik
k  vik. Thus, since uiki = 0, we must have uikk = vik.
Since ujkk = 0, this contradicts the inequality u
ik
k  ujkk in (8) unless vik = 0.
In the latter case, since vij2  vik, vij = 0 and we have a contradiction with
tjkj + t
jk
k = 0 > vjk.
2) Assume that tjkj + t
jk
k  vjk in all the terms of the sequence as 
converges to 0.
2.a) If tiji + t
ij
j  vij , then
ujkj  tjkj =
pij
pij + pik
uijj ;
where the right hand side converges to uijj . From, (8), u
ij
j  ujkj . Thus,
the limit of any such sequence should satisfy lim!0 u
ij
j = lim!0 u
jk
j =
lim!0 t
jk
j . That implies that lim!0 u
jk
k = 0, and requires that vij  vjk,
and lim!0 u
ij
i = vij vjk. Since ujkk  uikk , then we also have lim!0 uikk = 0.
But if lim!0 u
jk
k = 0, then lim!0 t
ik
k = 0, whereas t
ik
i  uiki . Thus, if vik >
vij   vjk, then lim!0 tiki + tikk < vik and then lim!0 uikk > vik (vij vjk)2 > 0,
which is a contradiction. Therefore, vik  vij   vjk. Since lim!0 tiki =
lim!0 u
ij
i = vij vjk, then lim!0 uikk = 0 = lim!0 ujkk . Thus, lim!0 uiki >
0, only if lim!0 uiki = vij vjk. In this case, we would have ui = lim!0 uiji =
lim!0 uiki , uk = lim!0 u
ik
k = lim!0 u
jk
k , and uj = lim!0 u
ij
j = lim!0 u
jk
j .
This equation, together with ui+uk = vik, ui+uj = vij uj +uk = vjk has a
solution only in Region 3 (vik = vij   vjk). Thus, if vik < vij   vjk, uiki = 0
for  small, so that tiki = 0, so that u
ij
j  vij2 , and then vjk 
vij
2 . This is
Region 2, and the limit coincides with the one stated in the Proposition.
2.b) If tiji +t
ij
j > vij , then u
ij
i (= u
ij
j ) = 0, so that t
ik
i = 0, and since from
(8) uiji  uiki , then uiki = 0. On the other hand, tikk approaches 0 as  ! 0,
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and then tiki + t
ik
k approaches 0, which contradicts u
ik
i = 0 unless vik = 0.
Moreover in this latter case tjkj = t
jk
k = 0, so that u
jk
j = u
jk
k =
vjk
2 , so that
ujkj > u
ij
j which contradicts (8).
7.2 Proof of Lemma 1
Without loss of generality, assume that vi = 0, for all i = 1; 2; 3. Assume the
core is not empty, that is, condition (2) holds, and that x does not belong
to the core. We will show that x does not belong to the BS of the grand
coalition. We do not need to consider allocations where xi < 0 for some i,
or where x1 + x2 + x3 < V , since they cannot be in the BS. Thus, assume
that xi + xj < vij for some i; j, so that xk > V   vij , for k 6= i; j: Consider
an objection y of i against k where yi + yj = vij , with yi > xi and yj > xj .
A counter-objection z of k against i would have to satisfy that zj  yj , and
zj+zk = vjk, so that zk  vjk yj = vjk (vij yi). Also, zk  xk > V  vij .
Therefore, if
vjk   (vij   yi) < V   vij ;
or
yi < V   vjk;
then the objection y would have no counter-objection and x would not belong
to the BS. If xi < V   vjk we can always construct such y, and then a
necessary condition for x to belong to the BS is that xi  V  vjk. Switching
the subscripts i and j, we could consider an objection y0 of j against k, and
repeat the argument to show that a necessary condition for x to belong to
the BS is that xj  V   vik. Thus, a necessary condition is that
xi + xj  2V   vjk   vik  vij ;
where the last inequality follows from condition (2). This contradicts that
xi + xj < vij and proves that the BS coincides with the core when the
latter is not empty. Now assume that condition (2) is not satised. In
particular, this implies that we are in Region 3. We have shown above that
the R solution belongs to the BS. So we only need to show that any other
allocation does not belong to the BS. Note that (2) implies that for any
feasible allocation (including the e¢ cient ones), if xi = Ui+  (in Region 3),
then xj + xk  vjk   , for any  > 0. So, consider an e¢ cient allocation
such that this is the case for some , and an objection y of j against i, with
yj = xj +

2 and yk = vjk   yj = vjk   xj   2 . A counter-objection z of i
against j should satisfy that zk  yk but also zi  xi, so that zk  vik   xi.
Thus, for i to indeed have a counter-objection against j it is required that
vik   xi = vik   Ui     yk = vjk   xj   
2
;
that is, xj  vjk vik+Ui+ 2 = Uj+ 2 , where the last equality follows from
the denition of Ui. Thus, this is a necessary condition for x to be in the
BS. Switching the subscripts j and k, we would also conclude that another
necessary condition is that xk  Uk+ 2 . Thus, a necessary condition is that
xi = V  xj  xk  V  Uj  Uk    = Ui  . And this contradiction proves
the result. QED
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7.3 Proof of Remark 4
Existence: For  small, let u1i1 = u
1i
i =
v1i
2 for i = 2; 3, p = 1 2, and p1i = 
for i = 1; 2. Thus, t1ii = 0, and u
1i
i = u
1i
1 =
v1i
2 . Also, t
23
i = (1   )v1i2 , so
that t232 + t
23
3 = (1   )v12+v132 . If v12+v132 > v23, then for  small u23i = 0.
Hence, t122 = t
13
3 = 0. If
v12+v13
2 = v23, then it must be that v12 = v13 = v23.
Then u23i =
v23
2 . Still, t
12
2 = t
13
3 = 0. In both cases, we have an  PSBN
with u independent of . In the limit, p = 1. Thus, applying the denition
of the R solution, U1 = v12+v132 , and Ui = v1i2 .
Uniqueness: Consider a limit of  PSBN where u121 = u122 = 0. This
means that for  small t121 + t
12
2 = t
12
2 =
p23u232
1 (p+p12) > v12. This is a contra-
diction, unless p23 = p13 = 0. since u232  v23  v12 and p23  1  (p+ p12).
Also p23 = p13 = 0 implies p + p13 = 1, which violates the third condition
in the denition of an  PSBN, so indeed u121 = u122 = 0 cannot be the
limit of a sequence of  PSBN. For the same argument, we cannot have
u131 = u
13
3 = 0. Thus, since t
1i
1 = 0, we have that u
12
2  v122 , and u133  v132 .
Also, u1i1 > 0, since p23  1  , and so t1ii < v23 for all  > 0. Thus, p1i  
, for i = 2; 3. Thus, t232 + t
23
3 =
(p+p12)u122
1 p23 +
(p+p13)u133
1 p23 converges to u
12
2 + u
13
3
as  converges to 0, so that for  small, u122 + u
13
3 >
v12
2 +
v13
2  v23. Thus,
for  small, u23i = 0, and then t
1i
i = 0, for i = 2; 3, and p23  . Thus
u1i1 ; u
1i
i should converge to
v1i
2 , and p should converge to 1. This completes
the proof. QED
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